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A B S T R A C T
Marriages formed by religious ceremonies which are not legally recognized are often
cited as synonymous with unregistered Muslim marriages. The conceived illegitimacy
of such unions and the need for legal interventions has been raised in political dis-
course in the UK, as such marriages are deemed to counter women’s rights and wider
legal and cultural norms. The recent independent review into the application of sharia
law in England and Wales in particular brought the issue of legal reform to the fore.
This article uses the concept of liminality to argue that these relationships may in fact
indicate signs of integration, not isolation. Liminality is employed here to signify a
process of transition from one set of cultural norms to another, and unregistered
religious-only marriages in this theoretical framework represent a transition from state
recognized unions, towards the widely accepted cultural norm of cohabitation. This
new cultural practice remains in flux. This article draws on empirical research seeking
to explore ‘English narratives’ where Muslim marriage practices are concerned. Focus
group discussions and discourse analysis methodology are utilized to explore marriage
practices in order to ascertain emerging norms and the perceived need or otherwise to
register marriages with the state. These narratives are key to understanding the trend
towards unregistered marriages. This article explores two key thematic areas which
emerged in this research, namely, (i) integration: to register or not to register; and
(ii) categories of Nikah.
1 . I N T R O D U C T I O N
In its 2015 scoping exercise, the Law Commission for England and Wales defined
‘religious-only’ marriages as a marriage ‘formed by a religious ceremony not recog-
nized as legally valid’.1 This form of marriage is most often portrayed in current lit-
erature as synonymous with Muslim marriage practices and is described as a
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burgeoning trend.2 ‘Unregistered’3 Muslim marriages are seen in all jurisdictions,
whether Muslim citizens form the minority or indeed the majority.4 However, while
in Muslim majority states they remain exceptional, in Muslim minority contexts re-
search suggests that they may account for the majority of Muslim marriages. In the
most recent and extensive survey of its kinds, True Vision Aire and Channel 4 com-
missioned a survey of 903 Muslim women during 2016–17, and found 60 per cent of
the respondents were in religious-only marriages.5
Questions over the legal status of these marriages arise due to non-compliance with for-
mal marriage requirements. In England and Wales, the Marriage Act 1949 requires mar-
riages to be preceded by a period of 28 days’ notice, celebrated in a particular location6 and
conducted in the presence of designated officials.7 In contrast, the Nikah (Muslim marriage
ceremony) can occur anywhere, at anytime; with no specific ceremony, usually, although
not exclusively, in the presence of witnesses. The couple involved may ponder on the legal-
ities of their marriage at various points in time: prior to the religious ceremony, following
the celebrations, at key points during ‘married’ life, or upon breakdown of the relationship.
The discourse around the need or otherwise to undergo a legally recognised ceremony of
marriage will differ according to the point in the relationship, and the associated priorities.
Sharp focus on the outcome of such relationships has been drawn by the recently
published ‘Siddique Report,’8 an independent review into the application of sharia law
in England and Wales. Amongst the recommendations were changes to the Marriage
Act 1949 and Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 to ‘ensure civil marriages are conducted’
and included suggested reforms whereby ‘the celebrant of specified marriages, includ-
ing Islamic marriages, would face penalties should they fail to ensure the marriage is
also civilly registered. This would make it a legal requirement for an Islamic marriage
to be civilly registered before or at the same time as the Islamic ceremony.’9 Such
2 The earliest study was by Shah Kazemi, Untying the Knot: Muslim Women, Divorse and the Shariah (2001)
Nuffield Foundation. Further research has been undertaken by Rajnaara Akhtar, ‘Unregistered Muslim
Marriages: An Emerging Culture of Celebrating Rites and Conceding Rights’ in Rebecca Probert, Jo Miles
and Pervez Mody (eds), Marriage Rites and Rights (Hart Publishing 2015) 182; Vishal Vora, ‘The Problem
of Unregistered Muslim Marriages: Questions and Solutions’ (2016) 46 Family Law 95; Kathryn
O’Sullivan and Leyla Jackson, ‘Muslim Marriage (non) Recognition: Implications and Possible Solutions
(2017) 39(1) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 22.
3 The use of the term ‘unregistered’ marriages in this article signifies a lack of adherence to legal formalities.
However, it should be noted that being ‘unregistered’ does not necessarily mean the marriage will not be
recognized by the state.
4 Maaike Voorhoeve, ‘Law and Social Change in Tunisia: The Case of Unregistered Marriage’ (2018) 7(3)
Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 479–497; Eva Nisa, ‘Unregistered Marriages of Indonesian Migrant
Workers in Malaysia: Contrasting Positions of State Agents’ (2018) 6 Sociology of Islam (forthcoming),
Islam Uddin, ‘Nikah-Only Marriages: Causes, Motivations and it’s Impact on Dispute Resolution and
Islamic Divorce Proceedings in England and Wales’ (2018) 7(3) Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 401–
426; and Annelies Moors, Martijn de Koning and Vanessa Vroon-Najem, ‘Concluding an ‘Illegal Islamic
Marriage’ in the Netherlands: Controversy, Criminalization and Contestations’, (2018) 6 Sociology of
Islam (forthcoming).
5 The truth about Muslim Marriages Survey Findings, <http://truevisiontv.com/films/details/295/the-truth-
about-muslim-marriage> accessed 28 November 2017.
6 s 44(2).
7 s 44(2)(a) and (b), Marriages Act 1949.
8 The independent review into the application of sharia law in England and Wales, February 2018. <www.
gov.uk/government/publications> accessed 18 June 2018.
9 ibid at 17.
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invasive changes to the law should be approached cautiously in the absence of exten-
sive empirical research into marriage practices within Muslim communities, including a
better understanding of the motivations of couples who opt out of formal recognition.
This paper serves to provide some evidences of the complexity of the issue, present-
ing an exploration of the narratives emerging in discourse between Muslims within the
UK, and placing this within its wider cultural context. This range of voices is often
missing in political and media discourse on the issue, both of which, as demonstrated
by the Siddiqui report, are often preoccupied with the singular paradigm case of disad-
vantaged Muslim women whose rights are being usurped by a legal system which does
not recognise religious marriages. However, examining the discourse of individuals
whose relationships have not broken down is imperative to understanding this issue in
a more universal way. This allows for engagement with narratives around marriage
practices and potential motivations for religious-only marriages, understanding of the
legal system and its function in upholding family ties, and the emerging cultural norms
evident in the marriage practices of Muslims living in England and Wales.
A key issue is whether religious-only marriages display signs of isolation, or
whether they in fact display signs of ‘integration’. Focussing on wider social norms
and practices pertaining to relationships and family arrangements, statistics indicate
that informal family arrangements are becoming increasingly prevalent in both the
UK and wider European jurisdictions.10 How do such ‘post-modern’ relationship
types impact on religious-only marriages? This paper analyses the concept of liminal-
ity11 as the underpinning theoretical paradigm to test the argument that religious-
only marriages are a sign of cultural transition for British Muslims. In legal terms, a
religious-only marriage is treated as cohabitation. These arguments will be built
around the ‘interpretative repertoires’ or thematic issues of discussion which arose
from empirical research undertaken in the form of two focus groups. The themes are
(1) integration: to register or not to register, and (2) categories of Nikah (the
Muslim ceremony of marriage).
T H E P A R A D I G M C A S E
‘Religious-only’ marriages are not a new phenomenon in the British context,12 and
modern unregistered marriages are prompted by a plurality of contextual realities.
However, in political, media and practitioner led discourse, it is what I term the
‘paradigm case of unregistered marriages’ that is the main if not sole focus.13 This is
10 ‘Cohabiting couple families were the fastest growing family type between 1996 and 2016, more than dou-
bling from 1.5 million families to 3.3 million families.’ Families and Households in the UK: 2016, Office
of National Statistics (see <www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmar
riages/families/bulletins/familiesandhouseholds/2016> accessed 12 November 2017.
11 Introduced by Arnold van Gennep, The Rites of Passage (University of Chicago Press 1909), and later ela-
borated by Victor Turner, ‘Betwixt and Between: The Liminal Period in Rites de Passage’ in The Forest of
Symbols, Aspects of Ndembu Ritual (Cornell University Press 1967) 93–111.
12 Dating back centuries, such ‘clandestine’ marriages were once the purview of Anglican clergymen who
solemnised marriages which did not adhere to canon law prerequisites. See Shabana Saleem and Rebecca
Probert, ‘The Legal Treatment of Islamic Marriage Ceremonies’ (2018) 7(3) Oxford Journal of Law and
Religion 376–400.
13 Rajnaara Akhtar, ‘Unregistered Muslim Marriages in the UK, Examining Normative Influences Shaping
Choice of Legal Protection’ in Foblets and others, Personal Autonomy in Plural Societies (Routledge; Law
and Anthropology 2018) 140–55, 146.
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the case of the disadvantaged female spouse and empowered male bread-winning
spouse, which results in the ‘wife’ being left homeless and penniless upon relation-
ship breakdown. While this is a problematic issue, the paradigm case does not repre-
sent all unregistered marriages and there are in fact a myriad of underlying
motivations for and forms of, religious-only marriages which will be discussed at ap-
propriate points throughout this paper.
Previous research14 indicates that ‘religious-only’ marriages are largely inspired by
a desire on the part of observant Muslims to adhere to normative Islamic religious
principles in entering a physically intimate relationship. Therefore, the ability to
enter into a religious-only marriage is synonymous with the ‘right’ to enter into a sex-
ual relationship. The absence of the Nikah (the Muslim ceremony of marriage)
results in such a relationship being considered sinful. However, those who enter
unregistered marriages do not display a homogenous group identity, much like its
closest associated relationship type – the cohabiting couple. Further, women in
religious-only marriages mirror the difficulties faced by women in cohabiting rela-
tionships labouring under the mistaken assumption of legal protection. In the case of
England and Wales, there are limited rights available to them.15 This gives rise to the
question of how these practices are construed in wider society, and the core issue of
whether religious-only marriages indicate signs of isolation or integration.
L I M I N A L I T Y : M A R R I A G E P R A C T I C E S I N T R A N S I T I O N
The theoretical framework underpinning this paper is the concept of ‘liminality’.
While the roots of liminality are found in the ideas of rituals,16 its transferral to polit-
ical and cultural changes is of significance here. Anthropologist Arnold van Gennep’s
seminal work on the area begins by deconstructing society into separate social group-
ings, and describing the passage and transition from one group identity to another as
being separate and distinct for the sacred – rites of religious passage.17 Thus, liminal-
ity in its van-Gennepian traditional sense is described as ‘being on the threshold’ in
reference to the inner phase of a rite of passage which transfers a person from one
stage in their life, to another. This idea of liminality serves to expound the basic
premise of the concept of transition and Thomassen18 further describes this process
as being where rites mark the passage of an individual or social group from one status
to another, rather than this simply being the result of the passage of time. The devel-
opment of this concept has featured in theories of cultural change such as organiza-
tional culture in the work of Howard-Grenville et al,19 and in illustrating the
‘transcultural dynamics’ of transmigrants,20 to name but two.
14 Akhtar (n 2).
15 Akhtar (n 13).
16 Liminality definition from the Encyclopaedia of Religion (2005) <http://www.encyclopedia.com/envir
onment/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/liminality> accessed 18 July 2018.
17 van Gennep (n 11) 1–2.
18 Bjorn Thomassen, ‘The Uses and Meaning of Liminality’ (2009) 1(1) Journal of International Political
Anthropology 5–27, 6.
19 Jennifer Howard-Grenville and others, ‘Liminality as Cultural Process for Cultural Change’ (2011) 22 (2)
Organization Science 522–39.
20 Allen Bartley and Paul Spoonley, ‘Intergenerational Transnationalism: 1.5 Generation Asian Migrants in
New Zealand’ (2008) 46 (4) International Migration 63–83. Shirlena Huang, Brenda Yeoh and
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The stages of liminality are described as three-phased; separation, margin
(or limen)21 and aggregation.22 Separation involves a detachment from the preexist-
ing position or place in society, the limen phase entails a shift into a new realm which
is unlike the previous state, as well as unlike the state to come, in other words it is
the threshold of the transition and Turner describes this as ‘ambiguous’.23 The final
stage of aggregation brings about the transformed and changed person, who occupies
a different place in society. Turner describes this phase as returning the person to a
stable state once more, and by virtue of this, is expected to ‘behave in accordance
with certain customary norms and ethical standards.’24 This liminality process can be
reflective of cultural transitions. As attested by Thomassen, van Gennep ‘always
insisted that individuals make choices and effect social situations in any kind of soci-
ety.’25 Thus, it indicates a shift in practice, making sense of liminality as unfolding
‘social dramas’.26 Changes in cultural practice have previously been linked to ‘jolts’
which give rise to ‘unsettled’ periods of time.27 However, Howard-Grenville et al28
propose that ‘intentional cultural change’ can occur in the absence of ‘initiating jolts’
when considering changing cultural practices within organisations,29 and this can
also be extended to social groups. This supports the assertion that culture is not
static and that a change in culture can occur organically or in a positively engineered
and structured way.
In a development of van Gennep’s theory beyond the study of ritual passages in
small scale societies (and thereby, moving out of strict Anthropology), Victor
Turner30 describes the ‘experience of being betwixt and between’ referring to the
‘state’ of a person who is undergoing a transition or transformation, to include ‘phys-
ical, mental or emotional condition in which a person or group may be found at a
particular time’.31 Turner refers to transition as a process or a ‘becoming’ which cul-
minates in a new state, taking a processual approach.32 Thomassen describes
Turner’s approach as broadening the application of liminality leading to parallels
being drawn with modern societies instead of the specific ethnographic tribal context
which van Gennep was concerned with. ‘Turner realized that ‘liminality’ served not
only to identify the importance of in-between periods, but also to understand the
human reactions to liminal experiences: the way in which personality was shaped by
liminality, the sudden foregrounding of agency, and the sometimes dramatic tying
Theodora Lam, ‘Asian Transnational Families in Transition: The Liminality of Simultaneity’ (2008) 46
(4) International Migration 3–13.
21 Limen is the Latin for ‘threshold’.
22 van Gennep (n 11).
23 Turner (n 11) 94.
24 ibid.
25 Thomassen (n 18) 11.
26 ibid 13.
27 Ann Swidler ‘Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies’ (1986) 52(1) American Sociology Review 273–
86, 278.
28 Howard-Grenville and others (n 19).
29 ibid, 535.
30 Turner (n 11).
31 ibid 94.
32 Thomassen (n 18) 14.
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together of thought and experience.’33 Transformation and transgression may not
reach an end point however, and the state of ‘permanent liminality’34 is entirely
possible.35
In modern terms, a formal legally recognized marriages can be seen as a rite of
passage in many contemporary societies, where the couple transition from individu-
als into a family partnership bringing with it a new identity. This paper is not, how-
ever, focussing on marriage itself as a rite of passage, but rather, the process and
formalities of entering a marriage and the subsequent legal status of the relationship,
and how this potentially evidences a process of transition and transformation in cul-
tural practices of Muslims living in England and Wales. Thus, how has the process of
undertaking a ceremony of marriage transformed in relation to how it is marked and
celebrated and linked to the state, in light of wider cultural norms in England and
Wales? And what does this indicate in terms of liminality as a process of change
from marriage practices in cultures of origin to behaviours which reflect relationship
norms in wider British society, thereby indicating a possible transition in practice to
British cultural norms where family relationships are concerned.
Thommasen36 sets out the various dimensions of liminality which can now be
identified in subject, temporal and spatial terms. These relate to liminal experiences,
and not the rites which were first linked to liminality, reflective of the evolution of
the concept over the past 100 years and more. First, these can be related to three dif-
ferent types of subject (individual, social groups, whole societies); three different
temporal dimensions (moments, periods of weeks/months/years, epochs (decades/
generations)), and three spatial dimensions (specific places (a doorway), areas or
zones, or countries/regions). This model can be utilized to map out a process of
transition, with the subjects being individual Muslims as well as groups or commun-
ities of Muslims. The temporal dimensions of periods and epochs reflect the decades
since mass migration from the Indian subcontinent in the 1960s and 1970s. The spa-
tial dimensions are England and Wales as counties with an identifiable legal system
and family laws. These demarcations are to an extent fluid, as there may be no abso-
lute separation between the elements of each dimension. Bartley and Spoonley37 evi-
dence this fluidity in their study of East Asian migrant adolescents to New Zealand
where they argue that ‘transmigrants’38 ‘engage in such patterns of intense contact
and exchange between both sending and receiving societies (and perhaps others as
well), the two fields actually merge, and create opportunities to pursue alternatives
to the conventional path of settlement and “gradual but inevitable assimilation”’.39
With this theoretical underpinning, this article will now analyse the data arising
from empirical research undertaken in the city of Leicester with Muslim participants
33 ibid 14.
34 Arpad Szakolczai, Reflexive Historical Sociology (Routledge 2000) 215–27.
35 Bjorn Thomassen, ‘Anthropology and its Many Modernities: When Concept Matter’ (2012) 18(1)
Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 160–78.
36 Thomassen (n 18) 16–17.
37 Bartley and Spoonley (n 20) 63–83.
38 Nina Gillick-Schiller and Linda Basch, ‘From Immigrant to Transmigrant: Theorising Transnational
Migration’ (1995) 68(1) Anthropological Quarterly 48–63.
39 Portes and others, 1999, 228, as cited by Bartley and Spoonley (n 20) 64.
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in two focus groups. The discussions presented fascinating snapshots of the complex
negotiations that occur as Muslim individuals’ navigate the space between cultural
norms, religious doctrine, family law and their various cultural identities. The focus
groups were intended to elicit views, practices and opinions of Muslims on family
law issues and gauge how the interrelatedness of law and private family life was
viewed.
2 . E N G A G I N G T H E F I E L D
The empirical research conducted was intended to ascertain how views relating to
marriage are reached and/or formulated, their basis in fact or subjective belief, and
how views are articulated in terms of individual and group identity and notions of
belonging. Participants were selected using convenience sampling technique.40 The
two focus groups were not limited to any particular age, gender or other socio-
demographic profile.41
The following questions were posed:
1. When and where did you get married? (Individual question for each
member)
2. What was important to you about the marriage ceremony that you had?
3. Did you think about whether your legal position would change following
marriage? And do you think it should change?
4. In your opinion, is it important to register your marriage? Why is or isn’t it
important?
5. The law requires certain formalities for a legal marriage—like going to a
Register office—what, if anything, do you think should happen if those for-
malities aren’t fulfilled?
6. Some people think the law should equally control how everyone gets mar-
ried and not treat any group of people differently—what is your view on
this?
7. Is there anything else you would like to say about the process of getting married?
8. If things go wrong, who do you turn to? Would this differ depending on
whether it was a registered or unregistered marriage?
These carefully constructed questions42 enabled an in-depth exploration of the
participants’ understanding of the legal position and the impact of entering a legal
marriage, the factors which influence decision-making on these issues and general
awareness about family law. The data in the form of transcripts was analysed using
40 Ilker Etikan, Sulaiman Abubakar Musa and Rukayya Sanusi Alkassim, ‘Comparison of Convenience
Sampling and Purposive Samplling’ (2016) 5(1) American Journal of Theoretical and Applied Statistics
1.
41 Participants were only required to be either currently married or previously married, in order to ensure
that opinions were informed by subjective experience and practice. Once gathered, participants were
asked to complete an anonymous survey collecting demographic data, and they were then each assigned
with a unique number as an identifier.
42 Special thanks are extended to Prof Gillian Douglas for her help in exploring the potential questions for
the focus groups to ensure coverage of all of the key areas.
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the discourse analysis methodologies of Conversation Analysis supplemented by
Critical Discourse Analysis.43
The use of discourse analysis here is reflective of the intensive as opposed to ex-
tensive nature of the empirical research.44 The use of data from two focus groups in
order to conceptualize notions of marriage and legalities adhere to the qualitative
framework set out by Onwuegbuzie, Dickinson, Leech, and Zoran.45 Focus groups
enable access to the views of a number of participants simultaneously,46 while also
enabling discussion to ensue whereby participants can inform or challenge the views
put forward by others. This is a flexible tool which can be used to analyse the emerg-
ing discourses in a range of social settings. Sensitivities around this research area are
also overcome by this method, as focus groups provide ‘cohesiveness’47 and the sense
of identification between participants gives rise to valuable data.
Utilizing Onwuegbuzie et al’s ‘micro-interlocutor analysis’,48 the discourses within
the focus groups were analysed. However, as a side note, of course discourse is not
static, but rather continually evolving, even within the setting of a focus group where
the opinions of some clearly impacted upon the views of others where there
appeared to be a display of knowledge or perception of greater knowledge.
Conversation Analysis49 was supplemented with Critical Discourse Analysis and an
overlay of ‘generic’50 discourse analysis through the critiquing of the conversations and
arguments in the context of legislative provisions of England and Wales in both official
and unofficial texts, and the representations of academic scholars and social activists
related to these provisions. These methods enabled me to identify interpretative reper-
toires from the focus group data, and draw conclusions based on the themes that arose
within the conversations. Thus, two key thematic issues were identified, namely (i) in-
tegration: to register or not to register and (ii) categories of Nikah.
3 . F O C U S G R O U P D E M O G R A P H I C C H A R A C T E R I S T I C S
The demographic characteristics of the focus group participants can be found in
Appendix 1 to this article. Focus group 1 clearly occupied an older demographic pro-
file and displayed greater life experience which informed their opinions. Discussions
around marriage and families were experiential, and for many, the practices of their
children offered valuable intergenerational data.51 Focus group 2 had a younger
43 Margaret Wetherell, Stephanie Taylor and Simeon J Yates. Discourse as Data, a Guide for Analysis (Sage
Publications 2009) 49–92.
44 ibid.
45 Anthony Onwuegbuzie and others, ‘A Qualitative Framework for Collecting and Analyzing Data in Focus
Group Research’ 2009 8(3) International Journal of Qualitative Methods.
46 Sue Wilkinson, ‘Focus Groups: A Feminist Method’ in Sharlene Nagy Hesse-Biber and Michelle L Yaiser
(eds), Feminist Perspectives on Social Research (OUP 2004) 271–95, 184.
47 Donna Ambler Peters, ‘Improving Quality Requires Consumer Input: Using Focus Groups’ (1993) 7
Journal of Nursing Care Quality 34–41.
48 ibid at 3.
49 Ian Hutchby and Robin Wooffitt, Conversation Analysis (2nd edn, Polity Press 2008).
50 Charles Antaki and others, ‘Analysing Discourse’ in Pertti Alasuutari, Len Bickman and Julia Brannen
(eds), Handbook of Social Research Methods (Sage 2009).
51 5 of the 8 were university educated, and 4 were married for 20þ years. The majority undertook their reli-
gious marriage ceremony first, but all also undertook the civil marriage ceremony. The time gap between
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demographic profile, with 5 participants in their 20’s and 30’s.52 Of all participants,
only one was in a religious-only marriage.
4 . I N T E G R A T I O N : T O R E G I S T E R O R N O T T O R E G I S T E R ?
‘The Nikah ceremony is much more important but that is not what we are talk-
ing about. I class myself as a British Muslim . . . I abide by Islamic Sharia law
and I abide by British law and that is why I wanted both marriage ceremonies
and I want it for my children. If I was living in an Islamic country then I would
respect and adhere to that law of the land. I live here in England and so I live
by the laws here. My day-to-day practices are governed by Islam and how I be-
have and how I bring up my children and my family life etc., but in terms of
the wider world I live by English law and I feel very strongly that I could not
imagine myself breaking the law of the land so why would I with marriage?’53
The issue of identity and integration go hand in hand. The focus group participants
circled around the issue of identity and British-ness in a careful way. The statement
above was strongly vocalized by a female participant, aged between 45 and 54 who
has lived in Britain since birth;54 she described herself as a ‘British Muslim’ and her
religious practice as ‘understand religious duties, moderately practising’. In under-
standing these words, and those of other participants cited below, it is important to
place them in both their context of the focus group environment and its aims of
identifying Muslim marriage practices, and further to this, their co-text of the ques-
tions posed for discussion and the opinions of others.55 Her opinion followed that of
another female participant who stated in response to a discussion on whether the
civil and religious marriage ceremonies go hand in hand:
‘The reason that I haven’t got an opinion is that I think that it is very much an
individual couple’s choice and I think that we do not live in a country that is a
Muslim country so Sharia law is not always enforceable and that is why a lot of
people rely on the law of the land and you can understand why when these dif-
ficulties are happening.’56
The plurality of characteristics which vie for simultaneous priority in the internal dis-
courses of individual Muslims but also between Muslims is evidenced by this
account. In response to her statement, participant 1:1 was questioned by a fellow
the two ranged from the same day as the Nikah, to days and to months, with the longest being a year.
Most described themselves are ‘moderately practicing’ Muslims.
52 The ethnic profile included Indian, Pakistani, and Somali backgrounds, providing a more diverse group
than Group 1. 5 were university educated, two had been divorced previously, 6 had conducted both civil
and religious ceremonies, while one had conducted only the religious marriage. The gap between the cer-
emonies ranged from 1 day to 3–6 months. 4 had lived in the UK since birth, and the remainder had lived
here for between 13 and 24 years.
53 Participant 1:1.
54 Married for 21 years, educated to A-Levels, and a mother of 4.
55 Charles Antaki (n 50) 5.
56 Participant 1:6, female, aged 45–54, educated to degree level, ‘British Muslim’. She did not define her reli-
gious practice, instead writing ‘how do you define that?’
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participant who asked ‘so are you saying that Shariah law is not strong enough to
protect us’,57 in apparent disagreement. To which she responded ‘no, that is not
what I am saying’, which participant 1:6 concurred with. In agreement with her, a fur-
ther participant added ‘I think that British law comes in because Shariah law is being
abused by Muslims. It comes in to stop Muslims abusing sharia law.’58 Analysis of
this exchange shed light on a fascinating narrative and counter-narrative on the place
of religious laws in a secular state of which Muslims are citizens. It also revealed the
internal conflict which seemed to be taking place between recognition of the domin-
ance of state laws, and the spiritual loyalty towards ideals of religious doctrine,
whereby sensibilities about adhering to the law of the land were easily undermined
or at least questioned by one member of the group who believed Shariah laws were
sufficient to provide protections for couples choosing not to have a state-recognized
marriage. It is interesting that none of the participants attempted to critique the no-
tion that Sharia law is ‘strong enough’ to provide protection, nor to cite any eviden-
ces supporting the contention that problematic and patriarchal applications of
religious laws perhaps lead to the most criticism of Islamic religious doctrine. These
obvious rebuttals were not something any of those advocating adherence to English
laws felt able to contend, and instead, defensively responded in the negative despite
the apparent contradiction that then arose between this statement and their previous
assertion. If the framework of liminality is applied here, this evidences the liminality
process as described by van Gennep, whereby individuals and groups have separated
from the pre-existing practice (perhaps in the land of origin) and are within the mar-
gin or liminal phase transitioning between accepted religious norms and state prac-
tice, where to a large extent they remain in flux. Here, the transition is in process,
however, tensions can be seen in its negotiations with religious ideals.
A. Shariah Councils as an Alternative
The reference to ‘abusing Shariah law’ by one participant, in the co-text of the dis-
course, was in relation to the use of dispute resolution forums such as Shariah
Councils59 in a manner which empowered the men, while women were expected to
follow long-winded procedures to convince a panel of ‘elders’ of the legitimacy of
their claim to divorce. This ‘abuse’ of religious doctrine was something British legal
norms were deemed to safeguard women against. The Siddique report makes specific
reference to Muslim women pursuing religious divorces seeking redress from such
informal religious bodies as Shariah Councils, and calls for the phasing out of
Shariah Councils, by compelling formal registration of marriage.60 It is noteworthy
that it is not religious laws per se, but rather their application that this participant
took issue with, and the safeguards within the national legal system against such
abuses would therefore be transparency, non-discrimination and fair representation.
Ahmed and Norton echo these concerns for vulnerable women, stating that religious
57 Participant 1:2, male, aged 45–54, educated to degree level, ‘understand religious duties, fully practicing’,
‘British Muslim’.
58 Participant 1:7, male, age over 55, educated to degree level, ‘understand religious duties, moderately prac-
ticing’, ‘British Muslim’.
59 No detailed critique of Shariah Councils shall be presented here for lack of space.
60 The independent review into the application of sharia law in England and Wales, February 2018 at 4–5.
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tribunals can potentially issue rulings which are inconsistent with English family
law,61 however conversely, they also acknowledge that these forums can assist vulner-
able religious women by providing a way out of their failed marriages.62
Inconsistency with English law pertains to issues of non-discrimination.
Another potential positive input by Shariah Councils, as identified by Jackson and
O’Sullivan within this scenario, is that they can give rise to the payment of mainten-
ance, which the non-recognition of the marriage by the state legal system negates.
They would rely on Shariah law provisions which require financial provision by the
husbands for certain types of religious divorces. Islamic law requires the payment of
3 months maintenance to the wife before the divorce is finalized, and if she is preg-
nant, then maintenance continues throughout the pregnancy and post-birth period
until the baby is no longer breast-feeding.63 It should be noted that enforcement of
such provisions is reliant solely on the husband’s will and community pressures with-
in this informal system.
This evidences the potential access to maintenance, albeit ultimately unenforce-
able, which Muslim women may have recourse to if no state family law avenue is
availed to them. Ali also contends that Shariah Councils provide women in ‘limping
marriages’ a way out,64 as they provide a forum where she can access a divorce which
is otherwise deemed unattainable. Ahmed and Norton concur with Ali, and further
add that religious tribunals can enhance the welfare of vulnerable persons (and that
they sometimes harm religious freedom rather than enhancing it).65
B. Choice versus Compulsion
‘It is very clear that you should not be compelled to do anything, you should
make an independent decision, your choice about who you marry and how
you marry, civilly or not. When you are not married you don’t know much
about this stuff at all really. Maybe informing people about this would be useful
allowing them to make a proper and informed choice, but certainly not com-
pelling them, it doesn’t sound reasonable.’66
This discourse was couched in terms of choice and inclined against compulsion, in
recognition of wider accepted rights in society to construct relationships as individu-
als see fit. This further supports the notion that liminality is in play as the same
choices would not be the cultural norms in lands of origin. Thus, this view point is a
reflection of transitional cultural norms and a process of adaptation where relation-
ship parameters are concerned. The Siddique Report’s recommendations can be
criticized for failing to take account of this autonomy.
61 ibid 381.
62 ibid 384.
63 John Esposito,Women in Muslim Family Law (Syracuse University Press 1982).
64 Shaheen Ali, Modern Challenged to Islamic Law (CUP 2016) 226.
65 Farah Ahmed and Jane Calderwood Norton, ‘Religious Tribunals, Religious Freedom and Concern for
Vulnerable Women’ (2012) 24(4) Child and Family Law Quarterly 363, 366.
66 Participant 2:3, male, aged 25–34, educated to post-graduate level, ‘understand religious duties, fully prac-
ticing’, ‘British Muslim’.
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In group 2, a discussion ensued about the legality of a Nikah-only marriage, re-
vealing what is probably an unsurprising lack of clear understanding of the issue, des-
pite the level of educational attainment of the group overall. Through the course of
the conversation, misconceptions were addressed as participants answered each
others’ questions. Individual experiences played a significant role in perceptions and
beliefs.
‘Youngsters believe that if they have had their Nikah done, the mosque, their
papers signed etc then they don’t have to have their civil marriage done. I faced
the same scenario, I had my Nikah done and I was told that was it, but no it
has no standing at all.’67
The younger demographic profile of this group resulted in different dynamics. The
groups’ narratives were couched more in terms of ‘choice’, ‘independent decision’,
‘informed decision’, ‘shouldn’t be forced to do it’ [register your marriage], ‘protec-
tion for women’. This again reflects a transitioning of acceptable and expected cul-
tural norms. However, it was clear that knowledge about the reality of that ‘choice’ in
the form of legal repercussions was not evident in the majority of the participants.
The outcome of a marriage not being recognised is that when the marriage breaks
down, through death or divorce, there are potentially dire financial consequences.68
The unregistered spouse will not be considered as next of kin, and on divorce the
courts cannot make any financial provision order, leaving any vulnerable economical-
ly dependent spouse without a remedy except through expensive civil law proceed-
ings.69 Thus giving rise to our paradigm case of unregistered marriages.
One of the participants who disagreed with the majority stated:
‘so if you are put in a situation where you are told that you have to have a civil
marriage done - well that is protecting you; in the eyes of the law you are being
told to do something that is protecting you and you are going to have your legal
rights in the same way that if you want to get married Islamically you have to have
a Nikah done. So, are you compelled to have a Nikah done? . . .. I think that not
everyone is fortunate enough to have an educated background or an upbringing in
that respect, and people don’t know, like this lady is saying that she didn’t have
that legal background and she had so many problems, whereas had she been
forced to have a civil ceremony when she had her Nikah done she would not be
in this situation now. So, we may agree to disagree but I think it is important to
be aware and it is important maybe to be forced to go down that route.’70
67 Participant 2:1, female, aged 35–44, educated to A-Level, ‘understand religious duties, fully practicing’,
‘British-Asian-Muslim’.
68 The couple will not be considered as spouses for the purposes of the Administration of Estates Act 1925.
There are further implications for pensions entitlements, although some pension schemes make provision
for cohabiting partners - In the matter of an application by Denise Brewster for Judicial Review (Northern
Ireland) [2017] UKSC 8.
69 For examples, relief through equity claims such as common intention constructive trusts or proprietary
estoppel.
70 Participant 2:5, female, aged 35–44, educated to degree level, ‘understand religious duties, moderately
practicing’, ‘British Muslim’.
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This participant argued against the freedom to choose, over compelled formal regis-
tration on the basis that it would provide protection and prevent the harms described
by others. On the other hand, the rest of the group disagreed, for a variety of reasons.
One participant questioned that state’s involvement in what he termed ‘civilian life’
where certain terms were perceived to be dictated by the state, where he was of the
opinion that they should fall within the private ‘civilian’ domain.71 This idea of mar-
riage as either a ‘public affair’ or a ‘private affair’ is a dichotomy that has historically
marred marriage laws.72 In the interests of parity with other religious groups, one
participant’s view was that ‘everybody’s religious ceremonies should be considered le-
gally binding’.73 While she did not cite the religious groups being referred to, only
Anglicans benefit from a purely religious marriage ceremony with state recognition.74
Yet others in both groups also disagreed with this position, citing pragmatic difficul-
ties in incorporating a wide range of different processes.
‘I feel that as we live here, we still have to abide by the law of the land and you
can’t expect them to take into consideration everyone’s faiths. I don’t think that it is
practical.’75 This was supported by another, who recognised the complexities
of translating multitudes of religious laws into a workable set of legislation.76
‘I think that one law for me is quiet alright’,77 stated one, while another opined
that having one set of laws regulating everyone simply made things a lot
‘easier’.78
To the exclusion of those who may suffer under the misconception that their reli-
gious marriage is valid and recognized by the state, the fact remains that all the other
(no doubt majority) of couples ‘never intended to formally marry when they under-
took the Nikah’, and therefore any suggestion that they should nonetheless be cov-
ered by the law is deeply problematic. As pointed out by Probert regarding
cohabitees, ‘it is one thing to relieve the unequal impact of the relationship, but quite
another to treat the parties as if they actually had married’.79 Further to this, the chal-
lenging nature of such accommodation has been identified by numerous academics,
and Ali takes the position that ‘acceding to the demands for accommodating diverse
religious and cultural traditions is a slippery slope, since the ingredients of this
accommodation are contested, undefined and boundaryless’.80 The difficulties and
71 Participant 2:3.
72 Rebecca Probert, ‘When are we Married? Void, Non-existent and Presumed Marriages’ (2002) Legal
Studies 398.
73 Participant 2:2.
74 Jews and Quakers benefit from some ceremonial exemptions, however, they are required to give notice to
the Register Office.





79 Rebecca Probert, ‘A Review of Cohabitation: The Financial Consequences of Relationship Breakdown,
Law Com. No. 307 (HMSO 2007)’ (Fall 2007) 41(3) Family Law Quarterly 521–36, 524.
80 Ali (n 64) 208.
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confusion that recognition would potentially give rise to are self-explanatory.
Furthermore, the European Court of Human Rights affirmed in the cases of Munoz
Dias v Spain81 and Serife Yegit v Turkey82 that civil marriages are available to all peo-
ple irrespective of their religious or other beliefs and practices, therefore there was
no discrimination in a lack of recognition of the Roma and Islamic marriages respect-
ively in these cases.
C. Cohabitation
A religious-only marriage is the functional equivalent of cohabitation, which is a
growing trend within the dominant cultures in England and Wales.83 The message
being advocated by this cultural practice is that family relationships outside of the
state’s domain are perfectly acceptable. As stated by participant 1:7, ‘half of the coun-
try is [living together] without a civil ceremony and they accept it and are accepted
and go on . . . .’ His words referred to the acceptability of informal relationships in
wider society, of which Muslims form a part. This admission is reflective of the pro-
cess of liminal transition whereby the legal effect of the religious-only marriage is
being analogized with cohabitation, although no discussion was entered on how cou-
ples would feel being described at cohabitants. The significance attached to the civil
ceremony, where it did occur, was largely absent. ‘It was just literally ticking a law
box. Something my family said needed to be done.’84
This dominant message of society’s acceptance of cohabitation outside legal
domains is being internalized, and coupled with normative religious dictates necessi-
tating performance of the Nikah, which remains unrecognized by the state, Muslim
couples are displaying a process of internalization, adaptation, and integration.
Where marriage is concerned, there is a transitioning process taking place. However,
the outcome of the relationship may look and feel very different to cohabitation, as
the Nikah imbues Muslim community legitimacy upon the relationship and the cou-
ple will very much consider themselves ‘married’, as was evidenced within the focus
group discussion. The purpose of that marriage is not recognition by the state, but
rather recognition by God, and thereby the communities in which the couples live. It
should be noted that cohabitation may be a commonly occurring practice, however,
it raises all of the same issues with regards to legal protection as unregistered mar-
riages. Both Haskey85 and Barlow et al86 found that the prevalence of public attitudes
reflecting a belief that ‘common law’ spouses are protected by law stands at around
50 per cent. Similarly, some Muslim couples in unregistered marriages seem to
81 [2009] Application No 49151/07.
82 [2010] Application No 3976/05.
83 ‘Cohabiting couple families were the fastest growing family type between 1996 and 2016, more than dou-
bling from 1.5 million families to 3.3 million families.’ Families and Households in the UK: 2016, Office
of National Statistics (see <www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/ birthsdeaths andmar
riages/families/bulletins/familiesandhouseholds/2016> accessed 12 November 2017.
84 Participant 1:3.
85 John Haskey, ‘Cohabitation and Births Outside Marriage after 1970: A Rapidly Evolving Phenomenon’ in
Rebecca Probert, (ed), Cohabitation and Non-Marital Births in England and Wales, 1600-2012 (Palgrave
Macmillan 2014) 179.
86 Ann Barlow and others, ‘Cohabitation and the Law: Myths, Money and the Media, in Park A. et al, 24th
British Social Attitudes Report (2008, Sage).
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labour under the same misconceptions. Therefore, suggestions that legal reform is
required to remedy the situation of Muslim women in religious-only marriages, while
cohabitees are left without the same consideration is deeply problematic.
The emergence of religious-only marriages and their ostensible popularity in the
present day is not unlike the trajectory of cohabitation, and attracts some of the
same responses in law and politics.87 Probert drew the conclusion that modern levels
of cohabitation, seen from the latter part of the 20th century, are historically unpre-
cedented.88 Muslims living in Muslim-majority states do not have the same cultural
liberties to enter a non-state recognized marriage.89 These states have their own sets
of marriage formalities, and of course the Nikah will form an integral part of it.
However, unregistered marriages are still possible, though largely prohibited.
Therefore, the presentation of religious-only marriages in places like England and
Wales cannot be linked back to lands of ethnic origin.
The ‘sending’ society norms can be termed normative religious influences pre-
scribing a Nikah ceremony for marriage, while the receiving state norms are the rela-
tionship practices in wider British society which include cohabitation, and it is the
navigation between the two which gives rise to religious-only marriages. These
relationships retain the appearance of the marriages of the sending state and the co-
habitation of the receiving state, and thus encapsulate a transitional relationship form
which reflects attachment to cultural norms of both places. This is analogous to
Glick-Schiller and Basch’s proposition that transmigrants live simultaneously in the
sending and receiving locations, being neither here nor there in the absolute sense,
with this unlikely to change in future.90 While British Muslims will often not be
transmigrants, religious-only marriages are similarly neither here nor there: neither a
state-recognized Nikah nor simply cohabitation. In liminality discourse, Turner sug-
gests that the process of liminality in modern times is not seen in ‘central political’
processes, rather existing on the margins and in plural forms.91 This supports the
argument that it is a process of liminality, which encapsulates the religious-only mar-
riages phenomenon as this has largely occupied the private space of relationships,
and family arrangements which the state has not been privy to.
D. Marriage in Another Form
This gives rise to a very important dichotomy. Are religious-only marriages cohabit-
ation ‘by another name’, or are they in fact ‘marriage in another form’? I argue that
they are in fact ‘marriage in another form’, as couples self-identify as married and
enter into the relationship via religiously accepted rites, yet they do not benefit from
state recognition for lack of adherence to the requisite formalities within the
Marriage Act 1949. Thus, they adhere to notions of liminality, evidencing a transition
87 This complex cultural exchange should not be ignored where legal solutions to religious-only marriages
are being proposed, and the Siddique Report fails to take account of this.
88 Rebecca Probert, The Changing Legal Regulation of Co-habitaton: From Fornicators to Family, 1600-2010
(CUP 2012) 277.
89 See for example, Voorhoeve (n 4), Nisa (n 4), Zbeidy (n 4).
90 Gillick-Schiller, Basch and Blanc (n 38) 48–63, 56.
91 Victor Turner, Process, Performance and Pilgrimage: A Study in Comparative Symbology (Concept 1979), as
cited by Howard-Grenville and others (n 19) 525.
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from cultures of origin and from wider British cultural norms, leading to the adapta-
tion of a relationship norm which evidences the fusion of both of these different
practices.
Further evidences of ‘marriage in another form’ are substantiated by the manner
of celebration of the nuptials, and previous research has indicated that the form of
ceremonies are very much aligned with widely accepted customs.92 Therefore, wed-
ding parties are celebrated with pomp and grandeur, in some instances costing many
thousands of pounds and celebrated with hundreds of friends and family members.93
These weddings bear all the hallmarks of a state-recognized marriage, yet the lack of
adherence to the formalities leave them beyond the state’s purview. A further distinc-
tion is that cohabitees do not undergo any formalities at all although some may have
gone through some form of commitment ceremony. The latter does not have public
recognition and by the very nature of the relationship, there is no paperwork. In con-
trast, the unregistered marriage does have public recognition, at least within Muslim
communities, and the Nikah contract is in written form.
Probert’s94 earlier work on void and non-marriages identified the problematic
nature of religious marriages which fail to conform to state formalities. ‘It is purport-
ing to be a marriage, in following the rituals prescribed by an external source, rather
than being intended as an alternative to marriage. It is believed by all concerned to
create a valid marriage. For these reasons it seems inappropriate that it should be
treated as a non-marriage.’95 However, despite this, it is indeed often classed as a
non-marriage. The idea of ‘marriage in another form’ does however raise interesting
questions relating to obligations, specifically, whether the form of the relationship
should impact on the issue of obligations. Douglas explored the link between obliga-
tions and commitment within the family, in a critique of the state’s imposition of
obligations within the family only in the instance of commitment via the medium of
a formal marriage.96 The question posed to the unregistered couple is: whether the
nature of their relationship, and its recognition as a marriage by their communities
should give rise to the obligations which the state imposes on recognized married
couples by virtue of their commitment evidenced by the marriage. Douglas acknowl-
edges that ‘social norms and understandings of family relationships are becoming
more contested as family forms and modes of behaviour become more diverse. It
becomes more difficult to agree on the content of the obligation, on whom it is to be
imposed and to whom it is owed’.97 Here, the obligation is to financial maintenance,
which historically was imposed on the male ‘head of the household’. A more gender-
neutral approach is seen within the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. Of course, the
obligations only arise on the actual breakdown of the marriage, in other words, when
the commitment made through the formal marriage ceases to exist. Douglas clearly
identified this apparent incongruity.
92 Akhtar (n 2).
93 ibid.
94 Probert, (n 72) 398.
95 ibid 406.
96 Gillian Douglas, ‘Towards an Understanding of the Basis of Obligation and Commitment in Family Law’
(2016) 36(1) Legal Studies 1.
97 ibid at 4.






/ojlr/article/7/3/427/5075173 by guest on 25 N
ovem
ber 2021
In a further exploration of the theme of commitment and obligation, the question
of how the issue of moral commitment made on the basis of religious and spiritual
values impacts on the notion of obligations arises. Studies in non-legal fields have
found that perceptions of commitment within a marital relationship can be related to
religious beliefs98 and termed as moral commitments.99 In the case of Muslims, one
respondent within the focus groups stated that the Nikah was a ‘covenant’ and there-
fore ‘something that is huge . . . it is spiritual and meaningful’.100 He continued in
reference to his civil marriage ceremony:
‘It is difficult because in those situations where you are thinking about civil
marriage and you are going through the process for example, it feels like a state
intrusion into civilian life. . . . . I felt like the state [were] being very intrusive,
I thought God, I am having to sit here and say these words when really, they
have got nothing to do with my marriage. Why on earth is the state getting
involved in something that is civilian.’[sic.]
This was a deeply revealing disclosure of the extent of the personal and spiritual
nature of marriage to this participant. The involvement of the state was felt to be an
infringement on what he views as his private personal life. However, this can be chal-
lenged, as the very nature of the obligations deemed to arise through the relation-
ship, whether religious or state recognized in nature, require enforcement. Thus,
‘privacy’ becomes illusory, and state apparatus or indeed religious forums such as
Shariah Councils, become involved. Further to this, the very nature of the Nikah
within Islamic traditions challenges this participant’s ideals, as it is viewed as a civil
contract.101
E. Illegitimacy of Children
The legal significance of non-registration are broad, and when asked, the Focus
group discussions raised a number of issues: immigration (‘My wife is not from the
EU, so if my marriage was not legal we would not be together’102), financial implica-
tion in the form of shared assets during marriage, and shared assets upon breakdown,
safeguards in the instance that ‘things go wrong’,103 inheritance (‘it is not just about
divorce. Anything can happen’104). One particularly striking issue raised in both
groups was the issue of the ‘legitimacy’ of children (‘what rights do you have over
your own children’105), although this is in actual fact largely irrelevant as far as legal-
ities are concerned.
98 52% of Christian respondents in a study by Judith Nelson and others. Judith Nelson and others,
‘Religious and Spiritual Values and Moral Commitment in Marriage: Untapped Resources in Couples
Counseling?’ (2011) 55 Counselling and Values 228, 237.
99 72% stated it was a moral commitment. ibid.
100 Participant 2:3.
101 See, for example: Tracie Rogalin Siddique, ‘Interpretation of Islamic Marriage Contracts by American
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‘ . . . what status am I giving my children? After the civil ceremony my children
are legitimate because otherwise they are cast as illegitimate children . . . . and
I wouldn’t want that for my children.’106
‘At least if the civil marriage takes place, you know that if there are children
involved then everything will be done properly . . . .’107
The legal position of children is unaffected by the marital status of their parents.
Historically, the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependents) Act 1975,
Family Law Reform Act 1987 and the Children Act 1989 had a profound impact on
the issue of legitimacy of children and consequent legal implications, and the change
in law in the UK was the culmination of a major shift in family arrangements wit-
nessed from the latter decades of the 20th century onwards. Children of non-
married parents gained the right of inheritance.
The rise in the number of children born out of wedlock from the 1970s onwards
are described by Haskey108 as an inevitable result of social changes which began in
the 1920s,109 and was facilitated by more readily available birth control devices from
the 1960s.110 Today, ‘almost half111 of all children in England and Wales are born
outside marriage, with cohabiting relationships accounting for the majority of such
births’.112 The issue of illegitimacy was closely linked to societal expectations, and
this makes the references to legitimacy within the focus groups very interesting for
the simple reason that there is no question of illegitimacy within the Islamic tradi-
tions where the marriage is religious-only. Thus, the concern here is very much the
state and its perception of the children born to these couples. The participants were
clearly concerned about children being deemed illegitimate and the (erroneous) per-
ceptions of negative outcomes of such a categorization. This indicates signs of inte-
gration rather than separation, as the view of the state was deemed to be highly
significant. There was a stark contrast between the lesser concerns for the law’s rec-
ognition of the marriage, compared with the law’s recognition of the children.
F. Transition and Navigation
Referring back to the work of Thomassen, ‘there are degrees of liminality, and . . .
the degree depends on the extent to which liminal experience can be weighed against
persisting structures.’113 He links this to Szakolczai’s114 premise that the convergence
of individual and ‘civilizational’ liminality leads to an intense impact on the subject.
Applying this to the case at hand, Muslim communities within Britain cannot be
treated as a single defined homogenous entity and the data gathered in this research
106 Participant 1:1.
107 Participant 1:6.
108 Haskey (n 85).
109 ibid at 190.
110 Rebecca Probert, ‘The Context of Illegitimacy from the 1920’s to the 1960’s’ in Probert (ed),
Cohabitation and Non-Marital Births in England and Wales, 1600-2012 (Palgrave Macmillan 2014) 149.
111 47.5%, see Haskey (n 85) 190.
112 Rebecca Probert (ed), Cohabitation and Non-Marital Births in England and Wales, 1600-2012 (Palgrave
Macmillan 2014) 1.
113 Thomassen (n 18) 18. Emphasis in the original.
114 Arpad Szakolczai, Max Weber and Michel Foucault: Parallel Life-Works (Routledge 1998).
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supports the argument that Muslims are undergoing individual and group liminal
experiences as cultures become more aligned, towards transitional cultural norms. In
particular, liminality ‘represents a possibility for a cultural hybridity that entertains
difference without an assumed or imposed hierarchy’.115 British Muslims are not like
the neophytes described by Turner, being here physically but not socially. Rather,
with entrenched generations, they are part of wider society, perhaps with some differ-
ing practices based on normative religious influences. However, shared language,
shared education, and shared social priorities with wider British society means there
is less that separates than connects. The idea of liminality as a process to describe
the flux which Muslims find themselves in regarding marriage and family practices is
entirely appropriate, and it is wholly plausible that this will remain ‘permanent’ as mi-
gration is a continual process with no cut off point. Therefore, Muslim communities
are always changing and adapting. This is reminiscent of Szakolczai’s view that mod-
ernity itself is in ‘permanent liminality’.116
5 . C A T E G O R I E S O F N I K A H
The interpretative repertoire from the data led to the identification of the second
theme ‘categories of Nikah.’ This is a broad term, encompassing the celebration of
marriage, the form of the ceremony, as well as the public/private division pertaining
to the performance of the marriage. In this part, the focus shall be upon norms in
wedding celebrations, taking account of the manner and form of wedding celebra-
tions undertaken by the participants. This is supplemented by an initial overview of
some potential motivations for unregistered marriages which present a complex con-
textual analysis of the phenomena.
Based on existing empirical research, as well as anecdotal evidences, we will briefly
turn to the following non-exhaustive list of motivations which precipitate a Nikah:
fledgling love, temporary marriage, priorities and lacking paperwork. While a limited
amount of empirical research has been conducted on the motivations for entering an
unregistered marriage, extensive observations and anecdotal evidences and reports in
media such as online chat forums, online news archives and lifestyle magazines can be
drawn upon to evidence the diverse range of practices which seem to be emerging.
Firstly, the category of fledgling love refers to Muslim youth and the transition to-
wards British cultural relationship norms. Here, teenagers and young adults wishing
to begin physical and emotional relationship similar to that of their peers enter a
Nikah, which is not intended to be a formally recognized marriage in their commun-
ities. A religious-only marriage allows them to venture into this relationship without
undermining their religious beliefs. Online chat forums evidence this, and in one
thread, a teenage girl lays bare her struggle with a boy she has been dating for 2 years
and has already had sexual intercourse with. She confesses her ‘sin’ and speaks of re-
demption through a Nikah which would mean that all future such relations would be
deemed permissible.117 Such relationships attest to the use of Nikah as a bridging
115 Thomassen (n 18) 18.
116 Szakolczai (n 34) 215–27.
117 <https://uk.answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid¼20101006113643AAkEq54> accessed 29 August
2017.
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method which enables a couple to have a relationship while adhering to normative
religious doctrine—liminality in process. However, the usual custom of living to-
gether following marriage is being eschewed, and seems reflective of a normative cul-
tural practice in the UK of teenage relationships. This relationship type is clearly not
being envisaged by the Siddique Report, as implementation of compulsory registra-
tion of Nikah would compel these young couples to formally marry while very
young, or indeed undermine the very possibility of them entering into a relationship
at this age.
Moving on to the normative practice of temporary marriages, the acceptance of
such arrangements differs according to religious doctrine, and seismic differences
exist between Shi’a and Sunni118 jurisprudence on the issue. Temporary marriages,
or Nikah mut’ah119 are accepted within Shia jurisprudence, while urfi120 or ‘custom-
ary’ marriages are accepted within Sunni jurisprudence, both being unofficial. In a
report by the BBC in 2013, the use of mut’ah was described as allowing the couple
to meet without breaking the ‘bounds’ of Islamic law. ‘We both wanted to date, to go
out for dinner or go shopping and just get to know each other better before getting
married, which we wouldn’t have been able to do otherwise’.121 It is very much
described as a bridge between traditional normative religious influences, and contem-
porary European cultural norms. Urfi marriages differ to Mut’ah marriages, being
characterized by their informality rather than their temporary nature. Urfi marriages
are entered into with a view to being permanent, but the fact they are not registered
with any state authorities gives the couple flexibility in how and when the marriage is
ended.122
Not all Nikah-only marriages have such variable outcomes, and many couples in-
tend to continue in a lasting and enduring relationship. ‘Trial relationships’ may be
the first step, wherein the couple will enter a religious marriage prior to committing
for life, much like an ‘engagement’ but without being official. Mehvash and Saad,123
an American couple who met through an online Muslim matrimonial site, dated
prior to getting married with a clear view to getting to know each other to ascertain
whether they did indeed wish to marry. Saad commented that ‘There are people that
don’t even believe in dating, but with modern Muslim couples that’s how it typically
works these days.’ Mehvash added: ‘but at the same time because we’ve been born
and raised in western society, we mix it up . . . but we’re still maintaining those val-
ues’. This interplay between religious values and ‘western’ cultural norms are a per-
sistent theme for young people and relationships in a process of transition.
118 In simplistic terms, the Sunni–Shia divide is theological, and both groups of followers of Islam adhere to
the teachings of the Quran. The Sunni Muslims also adhere to the Hadith or prophetic traditions, while
this is not a priority for the Shia.
119 Shahla Haeri, Law of Desire: Temporary Marriage in Shi’I Iran (Syracuse University Press 2014) 49–72.
120 Lyn Welchman, Women’s Rights and Islamic Family Law, Perspectives on Reform (Zed Books 2004) 42.
121 ‘I do . . . for now. UK Muslims Revive Temporary Marriages’, BBC News online. <http://www.bbc.co.
uk/news/uk-22354201> accessed 29 August 2017.
122 Annelies Moors, ‘Unregistered Islamic Marriages: Anxieties About Sexuality and Islam in the
Netherlands’ in Maurits Berger and others (eds), Applying Shariah in the West. Facts, Fears and the
Future of Islamic Rules on Family Relations in the West (Leiden University Press 2013) 141–64, 146–47.
123 Chris Zdeb, ‘Islamic Nuptials took Months to Complete; but Layers of Tradition, Ceremony and
Festivity were all Worth it’ [2014] Edmonton Journal.
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Moving on to priorities, an earlier research project revealed that the most wide-
spread reason cited for not registering their marriage was practical conveniences, pri-
orities and the demands on time.124 While the marriages under question ranged in
expenditure between a few hundred pounds to £35,000, for most of the individuals,
busy arranging extensive celebrations of the Nikah with friends, family and loved
ones, the need to give legal effect to the relationship was simply one formality that
was not a priority. For most of these individuals, adhering to normative religious doc-
trine was the priority. In these instances, compulsory registration may be helpful in
achieving a change in practice.
Finally, there are those who arrive within the jurisdiction without adequate paper-
work to prove their identity, and who thereby face problems in satisfying the legal
formalities in evidencing their identity, age, and eligibility to marry. Refugees and
asylum seekers are the most obvious candidates for this pathway into a religious-only
marriage.
It can be argued that religious-only marriages offer a solution to a wide range of
challenges, which may be faced by Muslims wishing to enter a personal intimate rela-
tionship. For some, a Nikah may present a solution to the problem faced by young
people who wish to date, but require a resolution which adheres to religious doctrine.
While the issue of temporary marriages are hotly contested, this practice reflects the
emergence of cultural norms of some of Britain’s younger Muslim citizens, whose
cultural practices pertaining to relationships are far more reflective of the norms of
their peers regardless of religious affiliation. However, these are often secretive sug-
gesting an additional conflict with accepted community and religious norms of the
elder generations. Thus, the choices are very individualistic, and these are collectively
effecting social change, as attested to by Thomassen in his analysis of van
Gennep.125 Thus, the decisions being made are by individuals rather than commun-
ities. However, evidence also suggests there is a transition in community norms, and
the recent survey of 903 Muslim women intended to decipher the rate of unregis-
tered marriages found that 60 per cent of women surveyed were in religious-only
marriages.126 This indicates a shift in practice, making sense of liminality as unfolding
‘social dramas’.127
Of course there are those who deliberately and unapologetically engage in
religious-only marriages, fully cognisant of the outcomes when the eventual break-
down through divorce or death occurs. The motivations can range from the desire to
protect wealth, the lack of priority for formalizing the marriage, a lack of conviction
in the need for a formal recognized marriage, and a desire to maintain their relation-
ship in the private non-state sphere.
124 Akhtar (n 2).
125 Thomassen (n 18) 11.
126 The truth about Muslim Marriages Survey Findings, <http://truevisiontv.com/films/details/295/the-
truth-about-muslim-marriage> accessed 28 November 2017.
127 Thomassen (n 18) 13.






/ojlr/article/7/3/427/5075173 by guest on 25 N
ovem
ber 2021
A. Celebrating the Big Day
Of those who enter marriages which are either religious-only or adhering to legal for-
malities, there are a range of priorities in their celebrations. The only global norm
where weddings are concerned seems to be the public nature of the celebrations. In
order to benefit from the rights of marriage, there is a perceived need to proclaim
your status before throngs of witnesses. All participants in both focus groups publicly
celebrated their nuptials and all were preceded or followed by formal legal ceremo-
nies, bar one, which at the time was still in progress. This can be contrasted with the
statements made by Coleridge J in the case of Burns v Burns128 wherein he refers to
the ‘the photographer, the marquee and the disco’129 as being hallmarks of a wedding
reception. Such ‘hallmarks’ are a global cultural phenomenon, and while the order of
priorities may be different, Muslim marriage celebrations are no different, while cus-
toms and cultures may differ.130 Thus, marching bands, photography, music and a
DJ, tiered wedding cakes, dancing, speeches, were all part of the wedding celebra-
tions of participants in an earlier empirical study.131
In response to the question ‘what was important to you about the marriage cere-
mony that you had?’, an interesting dimension was offered by participant 1:5, who
stated immediately:
‘I guess the most important thing for all of us Asians is the presence of the
family and as I see all of us Muslims here, then obviously the religious aspect
of it comes into it as well . . .. the Islamic aspect as well as the traditional family
aspect-making sure that close family are all involved and attending.’132
This participant put forward a view which he deemed was reflective of the entire
group’s position, based on the identities of ‘Asian’ and ‘Muslim’, whereby he con-
cluded that Asian families have large weddings and being Muslim results in the pri-
oritization of the religious dimension. This was followed by female participant 1:7
who agreed, but clearly distanced community norms from her own preference, stat-
ing ‘I think that if I had it my way, it would have been just the immediate family and
that’s it’. She stated that her wedding was bigger than she wanted, and that she would
have been happy with 30 guests, but instead there were 300 present. This tension be-
tween so called ‘Asian’ norms and the participants own desire, reflective of wedding
celebrations in the UK, evidences a transition in the manner of celebration.
Participant 1: 6 told a very interesting story:
‘My circumstances were very different, so I had my Nikah done but I wasn’t 18
for another month and I had to wait a month before I could have my civil cere-
mony but then that was a job because my parents had my passport and they
were going to take me to India [to get married] so the threat was always there
128 [2007] EWHC 2492 (Fam), [2008] 1 FLR 813.
129 ibid [6].
130 Akhtar (n 18).
131 ibid.
132 Participant 1:5, male, aged 25–34.
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until I got legally married . . . For me, my civil ceremony was very important, it
made me feel safe.’
Thus, in this situation, the civil marriage ceremony was pivotal to the participant
safeguarding herself from potential abduction and/or forced marriage. This use of
the civil ceremony as a protective mechanism revealed a different dimension to the
proceedings.
The tensions around the wedding celebrations were made apparent by other par-
ticipants, with 1:8 attempting to shed some light on the intergenerational conflict
and lack of agreement on priorities. She stated that her wedding was ‘quite big’ but
in those days that was the norm. While acknowledging that celebrations have been
‘cut down’, she still placed a great deal of value on the wedding as a ‘time to get to-
gether as a family and share in that special moment with them’ as a rationalization
for wanting to invite distant relatives to her son’s forthcoming nuptials. He, on the
other hand, could not understand the need to invite ‘so-and-so’s uncle [who] we
haven’t ever seen’. She went on to explain that the wedding was a special day for her
(as mother of the groom) and for the relatives, not just for the couple being married,
reflecting on particular family values which may not be shared across the
generations.
Participant 1:6 had a different experience with her wedding, as her family did not
approve and so she felt that she was deprived of the presence of loved ones at her
wedding, with only 30 people present, which also led to a deeper appreciation of that
aspect of the celebrations. Participant 1:4 on the other hand had 10 guests present,
and stated clearly that the priority for her was the religious obligation and so only
‘close and important’ people were present.
The transnational dimension of many Muslim families was brought to the fore by
participant 1:5, and following on from his earlier comments, he elaborated that his
wedding consisting of 750 people in Pakistan included a lot of extended family mem-
bers who he met as a ‘once in a lifetime opportunity’ as weddings were deemed to be
that one occasion when everyone would come together to celebrate. He ended by
stating ‘I have not seen 90% of those people since’.
This discussion around priorities where wedding celebrations are concerned clear-
ly focussed on family presence and the fulfilment of religious obligations. Only par-
ticipant 1:1 mentioned the civil ceremony, which was only attended by herself, her
husband and 6–7 other guests:
‘Even though that was really small, we started saying the vows and that meant
so much to me and they were really important to me because you don’t get
that at the religious ceremony, you are just answering questions . . .”do you
want to marry this man”. That was really important to me and a little bit more
meaningful in what we were promising each other.’
This reflection on the vows was an interesting admission, as the Nikah ceremony
simply requires affirmation of marriage by the bride and groom to the other. This
was also in contrast to the participant 2:3 who asserted the exact opposite sentiment
about his civil ceremony, evidencing a plurality of views.
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Within Focus Group 2, the general consensus was that the priority for the wed-
ding celebration was the Nikah. This was followed closely by the presence of the
bride and groom’s family members. Everything else was described as ‘paraphernalia’
(participant 2:3). Participant 2:2 described the ‘push away from the ethnic cultural
norms as a bride’ which allowed her to prioritize her own wishes relating to her
choice of wedding dress and order of events. Tensions were apparently due to con-
flicting expectations of parents and other family members, however, the very fact of
the assertion of the right and freedom to observe certain practices at weddings can of
itself be said to be reflective of transitional cultural norms.
Related to this, participant 2:6 described her identity as a British Muslim as a key
part of her wedding where dress was concerned:
‘.I consider myself British. Even in terms of picking the wedding outfit- I got
married in a white wedding dress but according to Islamic principles; I was
fully covered, I was wearing a hijab but for me that was quite an important
thing because I felt that my identity was more British.’
Both of these female participants fall within the 25–34 age category, and having been
married for 4 and 7 years, it is possible that their views are more strongly influenced
by a British cultural identity converging with religious values.
Participant 2:5 described herself as a ‘bit different’ as she grew up in Britain but
with strong ties to her Indian heritage. She married in a traditional red saree as this
was her mother’s wish, and she adheres to Indian cultural traditions in keeping with
her family norm. However, she describes her father as ‘an educated man’ which
prompted her civil ceremony taking place 3 months before the religious ceremony in
recognition of the lack of legal status of the religious ceremony, thereby resulting in
that occupying its own position of priority over the normative religious practices.
She described a balancing act between culture and religion.
Within focus group 2, a discussion took place that was not identified nor discussed
by the first group. ‘[The Nikah] is a binding contract between two people, it is not a
religious ceremony. You know you go to the church, that’s different, they have done
the religious bit there . . .. You don’t have to be in a mosque to have this done, do
you? You can have two witnesses and you can sign the paper and that is it.’133
The statement made by participant 2:4 seemed to have undermined the previous-
ly held belief in the utility of the Nikah as a religious ceremony of marriage.
Statements quickly followed in which there appeared a sudden disconnect between
the contractual effect of the Nikah, and the positioning of the ceremony itself.
‘I would say that it is a religious contract, that is correct but it is made into a cere-
mony by the environment and the circumstances in which it is conducted.’134
‘It is a requirement of Islam but it is not a ceremony in itself.’135
133 Participant 2:4, female, aged 45–54, educated to A-Levels. Failed to provide details of religious practice
and statement of identity.
134 Participant 2:3.
135 Participant 2:6.
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‘I suppose that when you say you are having your Nikah done, it is considered
your religious wedding ceremony but I agree, what you are getting out of it is a
contract but that is how I see it anyway.’136
When asked who else agreed, participants 2:1 and 2:2 also agreed. However, gauging
from the body language and the apparent hesitation by the participants, and the lack
of convincing attestations, it was clear that the impact of participant 2:4’s confident
assertion was to undermine everyone else’s previously held beliefs in the Nikah being
synonymous with the religious marriage ceremony. This is demonstrative of the fact
that issues around normative religious practices are perhaps not critically appraised
by even the most educated of British Muslims, and certainly within this group, this
very discussion was breaking new ground.
In conclusion to the discussion, participant 2:3 stated that the lack of recognition
of the ‘contract’ (Nikah) was evidence of the ‘non-inclusiveness of the modern secu-
lar world’. This was an interesting contention, as on many levels, the advent of anti-
discrimination legislation in England and Wales negates such an assertion. And the
state centric mono-legal system is a historic fact, which has faced challenge in numer-
ous forms over the decades and centuries.
7 . C O N C L U S I O N
British Muslim communities are not single homogenous entities and no single narra-
tive can possibly reflect the multitude of voices, opinions and practices which are
commonplace from household to household, social group to social group and com-
munity to community. The focus of this study has been the discourses around family,
relationships, and marriage within Muslim communities. These narratives do not
occur in a vacuum and Muslim communities are not closed off from wider society,
and not necessarily insular. Where unregistered religious-only marriages are con-
cerned, the use of the theoretical framework of liminality in this article provides a
clear narrative of the process of cultural transition underway. This infers a cultural
change reflective of wider social norms of cohabitation in Europe, enabling close
family relationships outside of the state’s family law arrangement. This cultural norm
is not evidenced in ‘cultures of origin’ where marriages and family relationships out-
side of the state’s purview are atypical further evidencing the transition.
This process of liminality is on-going, and unlikely to resolve in the coming years,
and may in fact remain in permanent flux. Previous Empirical research conducted
within Muslim communities demonstrates that one cannot underestimate the varying
impact of wider societal norms and practices on the practices and priorities in rela-
tionships for British Muslims. As expounded by van Gennep, ‘the life of an individual
in any society is a series of passages from one age to another and from one occupa-
tion to another.’137 This study has revealed the extent to which Muslim in England
and Wales are conducting their family relationships in a manner which reveals endur-
ing ties to cultures of origin while simultaneously transitioning to British cultural
norms. The use of focus groups in this study enabled a small number of these myriad
136 Participant 2:5.
137 van Gennep (n 11) at 3.
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of voices to intersect and provided valuable data on the emerging norms surrounding
Muslim marriage practices and underlying motivations, justifications and
conceptualisations.
This paper has engaged with modern traditions in Muslim marriage practices and
has identified some key areas within the discourse. The decision on whether or not
to register is largely determined by notions of adhering to legalities of the state, how-
ever, while all bar one participant was in a registered marriage, participants’ state-
ments reflected that the most important dimension of the marriage ceremony was
deemed to be the Nikah. The registration was largely conducted as a ‘tick box’ exer-
cise. Despite their own formal marriages, the majority were also staunchly resistant
to the idea of compulsory registration of religious marriages, with the discourse
couched in terms of choice and freedom, in parallel with the choices availed to wider
society. Thus, they would no doubt oppose the Siddique Report’s recommendation
of compulsory registration. It is clear that the Nikah is a means for entering into
both ‘official’ and non-official relationships as far as Muslim practice is concerned. As
a result, any move towards legal recognition of religious marriages is also deeply
problematic.










Demographic profile for focus groups
Group 1 Group 2








Lived in UK From birth (4)
Between 21 and 45 years
(4)
From birth (4)
Between 13 and 24 years
(3)
Nationality British (8) British (6)
Danish (1)















Degree or equivalent (3)
A-Level or equivalent
(2)
No. of years married Currently: 20, 14, 29, 29,
21, 10, 5
Previously: 15, 15
Currently: 4 months, 2,
4, 4, 7, 30, 12,
Previously: 22, 15
Nature of marriage ceremony Both religious and civil
(all)
Both religious and civil
(6)
Religious-only (1)
Time gap between civil and re-
ligious ceremonies
3 days, 1 year, 1 month,
1 month, 2 weeks, 4
months, x months,
same day
1 day, 3 month (3), 6
months























Group 1 Group 2
Description of Religious
practice:






gious duties, not practicing;
do not understand all reli-
gious duties, but practice
what I can; moderately prac-















ment best describes how you
identify yourself?: British







British (ethnic origin, eg
Asian)-Muslim (1)
British Muslim (3)
British (ethnic origin, eg
Asian)-Muslim (1)
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